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TOPLESS DANCING AND THE CONSTITUTION:
A NEW YORK TOWN'S EXPERIENCE
INTRODuCTION

Regulation of topless dancing1 has recently been at the crest
of a wave of controversy regarding nudity and obscenity. Indeed, this
seemingly harmless form of behavior has been the subject of countless
local ordinances and a plethora of cases2 reaching to the Supreme Court
itself. 8 The Town of North Hempstead, New York, has been fairly
typical in its response to topless entertainment. Yet, as this Comment
will indicate, the municipality's efforts to prohibit the activity have
proved futile. The Town's most recent regulatory attempt was frustrated by the decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, in Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank4 [Salem II], wherein the court
found North Hempstead's "anti-topless" ordinance to be unconstitutional. The overriding significance of the decision, apart from its immediate impact on state law within the circuit, is that it represents
the first time that a tribunal of the Second Circuit's stature has afforded
explicit first amendment protection -to topless dancing.
1. A representative description of the subject of this Comment is provided by the
California Supreme Court in In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 566, 446 P.2d 535, 537,
72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969).

2. Major cases upholding various "anti-topless" laws include: Yauch v. State,
City of Tuscon, 109 Ariz. 576, 514 P.2d 709 (1973); Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d
405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974);
Portland v. Derington, 253 Ore. 289, 451 P.2d 111, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
Until recently, the leading cases in New York were People v. Moreria, 70 Misc.
2d 68, 333 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1972); Brandon Shores, Inc. v.
Incorporated Village of Greenwood Lake, 68 Misc. 2d 343, 325 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup.
Ct. 1971).
For cases reaching an opposite result, see Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 522 F.2d 1045
(2d Cir. 1975), aff'g 381 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Wood v. Moore, 350 F. Supp.
29 (W.D.N.C. 1972); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655
(1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969).
A recent example of a New York court voiding an "anti-topless" ordinance is
Lucifer's Gate, Inc. v. Town of Van Buren, 83 Misc. 2d 790, 373 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup.
Ct. 1975).
3. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the Court upheld the
granting of a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Town of North
Hempstead's "anti-topless" ordinance. See notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text. The
Court did not, however, rule on the ultimate question of whether topless dancing is
protected expression.
4. 522 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Salem I1].
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This Comment will focus on the legislative and judicial history
behind Salem II, as well as on the Second Circuit's analysis of the topless dancing issue, and the implications of the court's decision for
future local governmental action in the area of topless entertainment.
Particular attention will be devoted to the Second Circuit's first amendment treatment of the case. This treatment is of importance because
one pivotal question in "anti-topless" litigation is whether topless
dancing involves a "speech" element sufficient to invoke the protection
of the first amendment. By appearing to respond in the affirmative on
this point, the Second Circuit has assumed a stance which is in opposition to that of a number of other jurisdictions.
I.

THE IMPETUS BEHIND NORTH HEMPSTEAD'S ATTEMPT TO PROSCRIBE
TOPLESS DANCING

On July 10, 1973, the Board of Supervisors of the Town of North
Hempstead held a public meeting to discuss a proposed "anti-topless"
ordinance. The measure had been prompted by a recent proliferation
of in-town establishments which presented both topless and bottomless
entertainment. Crucial to the community's resentment of such activity
was the location of several of these establishments in residential areas
near schools and churches. During the hearing, assertions were made
that the "topless" bars were the source of noise, litter and offensive
conduct. Additional objections were raised concerning the large percentage of customers from outside the Town and the fact that the
reputation of the municipality was being endangered by the presence
of the bars. In the final analysis, however, these complaints were
secondary to the townspeople's concern that the moral fabric of the
community was threatened. In particular, it was feared that the children of North Hempstead were being corrupted by exposure to topless
performances. 5 Thus, it appeared to the inhabitants of the Town that
they were facing a "moral crisis."
Whether the townspeople's fears were well-founded was actually
unimportant. They were determined to proceed against nude and
semi-nude entainment per se. As a result, Local Law No. 1-19730
was adopted, to be operational six days after the hearing. Not surprisingly, the ordinance was aimed at "safeguarding" the morals of
5.

See generally Exhibit B, Transcript of Public Hearing, submitted with affidavit,

Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1974).
6. NoRTH HEMPSTEAD, N.Y., CODE ch. 11 (1973).
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North Hempstead. 7 It banned topless performances in all public places
8
within the township.
Having decided to proceed against topless dancing directly, the
townspeople were faced with the further task of formulating legal
justification for the ordinance. When the measure, was drafted there appeared to be ample grounds for its passage. A close reading of the law
reveals that it was essentially a synthesis of two provisions of the New
York State Penal Law, 9 two state court rulings, 10 and a recent Supreme
Court decision. 1 Furthermore, the three elements which ultimately
determined the structure of the ordinance found support in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. O'Brien.12
In 1967, the New York Legislature adopted sections 245.01 and
245.02 of the Penal Law to regulate public topless appearances.' 3 The
impact of the provisions on topless dancing was limited, however, because the lawmakers added the caveat that neither section was to apply
"to a female who [is] entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition,
show or entertainment."' 4 Since topless dancing is "entertainment," it
did not come within the purview of the measures. More important, it
appeared that by enacting these provi sions, the New York Legislature
had pre-empted any further action against topless entertainment by
municipalities.15 To correct these deficiencies, both sections were
amended in 1970 to allow local governments to enact their own ordinances making topless exposure unlawful, "whether or not the female
is entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment."16
As a result of the amendments, municipalities throughout the
state had authorization (which did not require that the local laws
demand a showing of lewdness or obscenity) for regulating topless
entertainment. Almost immediately, local governments responded with
7. Id. at§ 1.0.
8. Id. at § 3.2a. The ordinance also banned bottomless appearances. Id. at § 3.2b.
9. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 245.01-02 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
10. People v. Moreria, 70 Misc. 2d 68, 333 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Suffolk County Dist.
Ct. 1972); Brandon Shores v. Incorporated Village of Greenwood Lake, 68 Misc. 2d 343,
325 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
11. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 108 (1972).
12. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
13. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 245.01-02 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Town of Babylon v. Conte, 61 Misc. 2d 1055, 307 N.Y.S.2d 735
(Sup. Ct. 1970).
16. Act of March 2, 1970, ch. 40, [1970] N.Y. Laws I 100 (codified at N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 245.01-02 (McKinney Supp. 1975)).
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"anti-topless" ordinances, explicitly incorporating sections 245.01
and 245.02 of the Penal Law. Two of these measures, which were
almost identical to North Hempstead's Local Law No. 1, were sustained in two important lower court decisions, Brandon Shores, Inc. v.
8
Incorporated Village of Greenwood Lake 1'7 and People v. Moreria.1
In Brandon Shores, the Supreme Court of Orange County was confronted with a challenge to an "anti-topless" ordinance by the owner
of several establishments offering partially nude entertainment. The
bar owner claimed that topless dancing is a form of non-verbal expression protected by the first amendment. The court did not share
his feelings. It stated that freedom of speech was not involved in the
case 19 and that the state (municipality) had the power to proscribe
many forms of conduct which threatened the well-being of its inhabitants.20 The court implicitly ruled that topless performances in bars
constitute such regulable conduct.
The court in Moreria was somewhat more explicit in its denunciation of topless dancing. The defendant was a topless entertainer who
had been arrested for violating the Town of Smithtown's version of
Local Law No. 1. She argued that her partially nude performance was
a kind of self-expression, the suppression of which violated her rights
under the first admendment. In rejecting her contention, the court
relied heavily on United States v. O'Brien.
O'Brien concerned a war protester who had publicly burned his
draft card to protest the Vietnam War, thereby violating a federal
statute which prohibited the knowing destruction or mutilation of
selective service cards. 21 The Supreme Court found unacceptable the
argument that the regulation was unconstitutional as an abridgement
of "symbolic speech" protected by the first amendment. The Court did
not accept the notion that all conduct is to be deemed "speech"-and
thus protected under the first amendment-merely because a person
wishes to express an idea.22 Moreover, in the Court's view, even if
defendant's action did contain a "communicative element," it did not
follow ipso facto that it was entitled to absolute first amendment pro17.
18.
19.

68 Misc. 2d 343, 325 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
70 Misc. 2d 68, 333 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1972).
68 Misc. 2d at 346, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 960.

20. Id. at 346, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
21. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 § 12(b) (3), 50 App.
U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1968), amended, Act of Aug. 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-152, 79
Stat. 586.
22. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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tection. The Court ruled that when speech and non-speech (conduct)
elements are combined in the same course of behavior, "an important
or substantial governmental interest" for regulating the non-speech
element can justify incidental limitations on first amendment rights.2 8
The O'Brien decision offered the Moreria court two justifications
for regulating topless entertainment. The first is based on the contention that topless dancing is conduct totally devoid of an expressive
element and that, therefore, the first amendment is not at issue. Regulation of such dancing, then, is subject to the reasonable exercise of
a municipality's police power. The second alternative embraces the
more sophisticated view that topless dancing contains a minor speech
element which, although cognizable under the first amendment, can
be regulated incident to the state's control over the conduct portion
of the activity. Conceptually, this position involves a splitting of topless dancing into a speech element (the dance itself) and a conduct
element (the partial nudity). Because a municipality might object to
such nudity as representing a danger to its moral structure, it can
prohibit it. The concomitant proscription of the speech portion of the
activity is justified on the grounds that the affected speech is only a
minor part of the entire activity and its regulation is a necessary incident to the regulation of the non-speech conduct. Although the
Moreria court did not specify which of the above approaches it was
adopting, either one was sufficient to sustain Smithtown's ordinance.
The Supreme Court's decision in California v.LaRue2 4 provided
the third legal rationale for Local Law No. 1. In the LaRue case the
Court dealt with a series of regulations passed by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverages pursuant to its power to regulate the
sale of liquor. The measures prohibited all sexually oriented entertainment 2 that the state agency found to be the source of widespread
misconduct of a serious nature (e.g., "Bachanalian revelries," sexual
misconduct between entertainers and customers, and prostitution).
In sustaining the regulations, Justice Rehnquist began the majority opinion on a note similar to that of Brandon Shores by stating
that the issue was not censorship (i.e., the first amendment), but rather
the licensing power of the State of California. Thus, for Justice Rehnquist the appropriateness of the regulations could be addressed only
23.
24.
25.
See 409

Id. at 376-77.
409 U.S. 109 (1972).
Topless dancing does not appear to have been affected by the regulations.
U.S. at 112 n.2.
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by looking to section 2 of the twenty-first amendment, which deals
with state authority to control the sale of alcoholic beverages.20 He
interpreted the amendment27 as giving California, and hence the
Department, "more than normal . . . authority over public health,
welfare and morals." 28 Although he did not precisely define "more
than normal," Justice Rehnquist concluded that the prohibition of
the enumerated entertainment from establishments licensed to dispense
alcoholic beverages was a rational exercise of the "additional" authority.
For North Hempstead's purposes, the critical part of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion was his concession that certain forms of visual
entertainment, which otherwise would not be found to be obscene,
might be prohibited by the regulations. He justified this holding by
finding, according to the second option provided by O'Brien, that such
"performances" partook "more of gross sexuality than communication." 29 He further concluded that even though such conduct might
be within the limits of protected expression, by confining its regulations to places which it licensed, California had not "forbidden [such
activity] across the board." 30 In short, the Court seemed to hold that
the twenty-first amendment authority of the state to regulate the sale
of liquor prevailed over any minor first amendment interest in sexual
entertainment; the state could, therefore, ban nude dancing as part
of its liquor control program.
For various reasons, LaRue presented little actual legal precedent
for Local Law No. 1.31 However, there was language in the opinion
which North Hempstead could find arguably supportive of its own
ordinance. More important, the majority opinion in LaRue evinced
an attitude toward sexually oriented entertainment which was easily
applied to topless dancing. In fact, the Town seems to have read
26. Id. at 114, quoting Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 41 (1966).
27. For criticism of Justice Rehnquist's utilization of the twenty-first amendment,
see Comment, State Power to Regulate Liquor: Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment Reconsidered, 24 SYaAcusa L. Rav. 1131 (1973); Comment, Demon Rum and
the Dirty Dance: Reconsidering Government Regulation of Live Sexual Entertainment
After California v. LaRue, 1975 Wis. L. Rnv. 161. But see, Felix v. Young, F.2d
(6th Cir. 1976).
28. 409 U.S. at 114.
29. Id. at 118.
30. Id.
31. One reason is that LaRue is predicated upon the power of a governmental
agency to regulate the flow of alcohol within a state, whereas the revised ordinance was
justified as an exercise of the police power of the municipality. For an analysis of the
distinction between these two bases, see Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478,
482 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 417, 509 P.2d 497,
504, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 688, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974).
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LaRue for the proposition that partially nude dancing in a bar contains only a minor speech element, and thus the entire activity can
be prohibited in the interest of protecting the moral welfare of the
community.
In sum, although acting from a perceived threat to its moral structure, the Town of North Hempstead did have some legal basis for its
attempt to outlaw topless entertainment. The prevailing rationale for
such action relied on the alternative characterizations of topless dancing
as "pure" conduct or as conduct containing only a minor speech element. In either instance, argued the Town, the activity is well within
the reach of a municipality's police power.
II. SALEM I TO SALEM II

A. Local Law No. 1 and the Federal Courts-Unconstitutional
Overbreadth
Upon the enactment of North Hempstead's Local Law No. 1, the
owners of three local bars that offered topless performances filed a
complaint challenging the ordinance in the Federal District Court for
the Eastern. District of New York. 32 In granting preliminary relief,
Judge Bartels found that the petitioners had satisfied the necessary
proof requirements by sufficiently demonstrating irreparable harm from
the law's operation 33 and the likelihood of success on the merits.
Crucial to the latter consideration was the judge's finding that the
ordinance inhibited the full expression of first amendment freedoms.
Moreover, he deemed the statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad
because the phrase "any public place" as used in the measure could
include such places as the theatre or town hall, thereby prohibiting
the performance of any number of works of unquestionable artistic
and socially redeeming significance.3
Unpersuaded by the district court's decision, the Town appealed
to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the granting
of the preliminary injunction.3 5 Judge Oakes, speaking for the majority, found it unnecessary to decide whether the actual topless
32. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
33. One of the petitioners, Tim-Bob Bar, alleged that because of the ordinance,
business had dropped fifty percent. 501 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1974).
34. 364 F. Supp. at 483.
35. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter referred
to as Salem 1].
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dancing in appellees' bars was itself protected expression. 0 Rather, he
chose to frame his decision in terms of the doctrine of "unconstitutional overbreadth." He conceded the likelihood that appellees would
succeed on the merits, because the ordinance amounted to an "across
the board" prohibition of admittedly protected expression-dancing. 87
Despite the Second Circuit's unfavorable ruling, the Town was
not deterred in its attempt to rid itself of 'topless dancing. Counsel
sought and successfully obtained certiorari in the Supreme Court.,,
As a contingency, the Town attempted to cure the unconstitutional
overbreadth of Local Law No. 1 by abandoning it in favor of a narrower measure. This revised ordinance3" was identical in all practical
respects to its predecessor, except that the phrase "any other public
place" was deleted. Thus, topless dancing was now prohibited only in
cabarets, bars, lounges, dance halls, discotheques, restaurants and coffee
shops within the township.
North Hempstead did not have to wait long before it appeared
that the revised ordinance would be its only recourse against topless
dancing. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,4 0 the Supreme Court upheld the
granting of the preliminary injunction against enforcement of Local
Law No. 1. The basis for the ruling was essentially the same as that of
the lower court: the measure was constitutionally invalid because it
swept within its ambit "protected speech or expression of other persons
41
not before the Court.
B. The Revised Ordinance to Salem Il-The Emergence of New
Considerations
After passage of the revised ordinance, a local bar owner and two
of his topless dancers were arrested for violating the law. Upon learning
of the arrests, owners of two other topless establishments terminated
all such performances and instituted action for injunctive and declaratory relief in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
New York. The complaint was grounded on a variety of legal theories,
among which was petitioners' contention that the revised law violated
36.

Judge Oakes did indicate that if forced to, he would have found the dancing

protected expression. Id. at 21 n.3.
37. Id. at 20-21.
38. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
39. NORTH HEMPSTEAD, N.Y., CODE ch. 11 (1974).
40. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
41. Id. at 933.
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the first amendment by placing overbroad restrictions on constitutionally protected speech-that is, topless dancing.
In granting full relief, Judge Bartels adopted a somewhat ambiguous approach to the subject.42 He concluded that the measure still

swept too broadly, because it could be applied to "communicative
dancing and theatrical productions just because they involve nudity
. . . ."43 Thus, he seemed merely to restate the Second Circuit's position in Salem I that the ordinance suffered from unconstitutional
overbreadth. Yet, he went on to cite O'Brien for the proposition that
the conduct of petitioners' dancers might contain a speech element,
thereby "affecting First Amendment rights. ' 44 Based on this contention, he found that the burden was upon the Town to show that the
revised ordinance promoted a compelling public interest. Judge Bartels
could find no such demonstration.4 5 Since the measure was also overbroad, he was "reluctantly '46 forced to conclude that this new attempt
47
by North Hempstead to prohibit topless dancing was unconstitutional.
III. SALEM II

Confronted with what appeared to be a second unworkable ordinance, the Town again sought redress from the Second Circuit. In
Salem II, however, the court finally focused its attention directly on
topless dancing. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Oakes concluded, inter alia, that the conduct of appellees' dancers involved a
"modicum of expression" which was of constitutional significance. 48
Thus, the court apparently had taken the position that the unconstitutionality of the revised ordinance was largely attributable to the
fact that it unduly infringed upon topless dancing, which is itself a
form of expression protected by the first amendment.
In contrast to Judge Bartels' equivocation as to the exact first
amendment status of topless dancing, the Second Circuit was quite
explicit in its constitutional analysis. Central to its argument was the
assertion that topless dancing involves "communication from one
42.

Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 381 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).

43. Id. at 863.
44.

Id. at 864.

45. Id. at 863-64.
46. Id. at 864.
47. judge Bartels also concluded that the ordinance violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and that the twenty-first amendment was not applicable to the case at bar. Id. at 864.
48. 522 F.2d at 1048.
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human being to others." 49 Although Judge Oakes failed to explore
the dimensions of this communication, he nonetheless established its
presence by identifying partially nude dancing in a bar with socalled "legitimate" dancing. Specifically, he quoted the proposition,
previously raised in Salem I, that "in substance" topless dancing might
not differ from a nude ballet performed at Lincoln Center. 0 He concluded that since topless dancing is merely a form of dancing, albeit
a distasteful one to some, it is entitled to the first amendment protection afforded the performing arts.
Since topless dancing was now a form of expression protected by
the first amendment, it was not subject to regulation unless the Town
proved that the behavior conflicted with some compelling governmental
interest.51 North Hempstead failed to make any such showing. Indeed,
the municipality was unable to prove any legitimate state interest in
regulating the behavior. What noise, litter and disorderly conduct
resulted from topless dancing could easily have been disposed of by
laws already in effect.52 The town's "moral crisis," which the judge
divined to be the real impetus behind the ordinance, 3 was implicitly
found to be without substance. It was undisputed on the record that
minors could not enter any "topless" bars. Any adults who might be
offended by such activity had ample warning of its presence. Indeed,
anyone who wished to avoid further "bombardment" of his sensibili' 54
ties might do so "simply by averting his eyes."

In the final analysis, it appears that Judge Oakes believed that
by regulating topless dancing, North Hempstead was simply attempting
to censor a specific form of behavior which it found distasteful. He
concluded, however, that the dancing was a "harmless form of diver49. Id. at 1049.
50. Id. at 1048, quoting Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d at 21 n.3.
51. In his first amendment analysis, Judge Oakes does not employ the term
"compelling interest." Rather, he uses the phrase "so long as some legitimate interest
of the State . . . is not infringed upon." 522 F.2d at 1049. However, a finding that
topless dancing involves protected expression would require the state to demonstrate a
compelling need for such action in order to regulate the activity. In other words, mere
public intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of a constitutional
freedom. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). Rather, there must be a demonstration that the speech is the
direct cause of a serious disorder (e.g., riot) and must, therefore, be regulated or even
prohibited. Such a circumstance is demonstrative of a compelling interest. See, e.g.,
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
320 (1951). See also note 69 infra and accompanying text.
52. 522 F.2d at 1049 n.12.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1049, quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
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sion or entertainment,"5 5 and that "when the government, acting as
censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
[expression] on the ground that they are more offensive than others,
the First Amendment strictly limits its power."5 6
B. Topless Dancing-How Much Protection?
While Judge Oakes clearly assigned "constitutional significance"
to topless dancing for both those who performed it and those who
wished to partake of

it, 57

his first amendment analysis stopped short

of defining exactly what the significance entails. His equal protection
treatment of the case, however, gives a more detailed picture of the
protection afforded the activity.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is
typically invoked when a statute (or ordinance) results in a classification of either groups or individuals. To test the reasonableness of the
classification, two standards of measurement have been employed by
the courts. The first test of whether a classification is invidious and
hence violative of the equal protection clause is the "rational relationship" standard. This test merely requires that the state demonstrate that the law is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective. 5s However, when a statute abridges a fundamental right 59
or establishes a classification deemed to be "suspect, 6° a "strict scrutiny" test is triggered. This test differs from the "rational relationship"
standard in that it demands that a state show a compelling reason to
justify the classification."' The practical effect of the "strict scrutiny"
test is to place an almost insurmountable burden on the state to support its enactment.
North Hempstead urged that the "rational relationship" test be
applied to the revised ordinance because the statute was directed at
nudity (conduct) and not the right of free expression. Judge Oakes
rejected this position, noting in the process that even under the less
55.
56.

522 F.2d at 1048-49.
Id. at 1049, quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209

(1975).
57. 522 F.2d at 1048.
58. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See also Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
59. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), involving the right to
travel.
60. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), dealing with state
law discrimination against aliens.
61. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
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rigorous test the Town had demonstrated no rational basis for distinguishing between a bar offering topless entertainment and a theatre
presenting a "legitimate" production involving nudity. 62 He proceeded
to point out, however, that the "modicum of expression involved in
topless dancing puts the case into the other 'tier' of equal protection,
[requiring] 'strict scrutiny' of the ordinance...." 0 8 Since North Hempstead had demonstrated no compelling reason for distinguishing between topless dancing in a bar and topless dancing in the "legitimate"
theatre, it failed to sustain its burden under the "strict scrutiny" test.
Thus, the ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
There are two implications to be drawn from the court's holding.
First, the invocation of the "strict scrutiny" test strongly suggests that
the Second Circuit has found that topless dancing involves the exercise
of a fundamental right. Second, any vitality which O'Brien might have
had regarding the constitutional treatment of topless entertainment
has now been seriously diminished. O'Brien's lessened influence is
crucial to the issue of what protection topless dancing is to be afforded
under the first amendment.
North Hempstead, relying on O'Brien, contended that topless
dancing could be split into a conduct element (nudity) and a speech
element (dancing). As a result, the Town reasoned that since pure
conduct does not involve the exercise of a fundamental right, it
was free to regulate the conduct element (but not the speech element
directly) on a showing that the regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest.6 As already indicated, however, Judge
Oakes rejected any application of the "rational relationship" test in
favor of the more stringent "strict scrutiny" test. The conclusion seems
ineluctable that Judge Oakes found topless dancing to be a single
expressive entity, entitled to full first amendment protection. This
finding precludes application of the O'Brien speech-conduct dichotomy
to topless entertainment. As further evidence of Judge Oakes' rejection of the O'Brien analysis, it is noteworthy that O'Brien is not mentioned in Salem II, despite the fact that it is one of the most frequently
cited precedents in decisions which uphold "anti-topless" ordinances. 5
The characterization of an activity as expression protected by the Con62.
63.

522 F.2d at 1049.
Id.

64. Id.

65. See, e.g., Orownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 427, 509 P.2d 497, 512, 107
Cal. Rptr. 681, 695-96 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974):
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stitution does not, however, imply that such protection is absolute. In
Salem II the court recognized that the constitutional protections of free
expression are not unlimifed and outlined two tests for deciding the
validity of governmental regulations of topless dancing.
The first test is premised on the widely accepted notion that the
exercise of first amendment rights may conflict with other societal
interests. While free speech is generally afforded deference in such
situations, it may be relegated to a secondary position. The judicial
standard for determining when regulation of speech is necessary has
ranged from the "clear and present danger" test66 to the ad hoc
balancing approach popularized in the pre-Warren Court years6 7 and,
most recently, to so-called "categorization. ' 68 Although conceptually
distinct, each of these approaches to the first amendment rests on the
premise that free speech is not an absolute right.
An illustration of this view is provided in Feinerv. New York. 69
There the Supreme Court sustained the arrest for disorderly conduct
of a public speaker who had refused to heed a policeman's warning to
cease addressing a crowd in a provocative manner. The Court reasoned
that the defendant's oration was about to incite a riot and that the
need for public order outweighed the speaker's first amendment right.
Judge Oakes employed a similar "balancing" process when he noted
that the Town of North Hempstead could not show that topless
dancing infringed upon an interest of the community sufficient to
overcome the first amendment protection involved. The Town was
able to make only remote and speculative claims as to the harms which
the dancing had caused. To justify prohibition, however, the municipality would have had to demonstrate, as the city of Syracuse had done
in Feiner, that the first amendment activity was the source of substantive evils which the municipality had a compelling interest in
containing. For example, if North Hempstead had been able to prove
that topless dancing was the direct cause of serious public disruptions
on the order of LaRue, the revised ordinance might have been sustained.
66. See, e.g., Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
67. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
68. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
On the differences between "balancing" and "categorization," see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 1482 (1975). See also T. EMERSON, TowARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47-62 (1966).
69. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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The second test for regulation focuses on the traditional first
amendment treatment of obscenity.7 0 In Roth v. United States,1 the
Supreme Court took the position that obscene material or conduct is
not protected by the first amendment.7 2 According to this stance, activity found to be obscene is automatically divested of any possible
first amendment protection. Moreover, unlike the "balancing" approach of the first test, a finding of obscenity does not necessarily depend on conflicts with other societal interests. In Salem II, however,
Judge Oakes noted that North Hempstead's ordinance was directed at
nudity, not obscenity.1 3 While obscene dancing is regulable by the
state, nude dancing-without a showing of obscenity-is protected by
the freedom of speech clause of the first amendment.
Thus, in Salem II the Second Circuit found that topless dancing
contains a communicative element of constitutional significance. This
holding charges local municipalities with the burden of supporting any
proposed "anti-topless" ordinances by a showing that the activity conflicts with a compelling governmental interest or is obscene.1 4 As will
be demonstrated, local municipalities will find that this burden is not
easily met.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF SALEM

II

A. Municipal Action Against Topless Dancing
In Brandon Shores, the court stated that the local community has
a right to determine for itself that which it finds "offensive to its own
general welfare... and morals." 75 Salem 11 makes clear, however, that
the power of the municipality to act in furtherance of its moral wellbeing is not unlimited when protected expression is involved. Indeed,
the decision places a heavy burden of justification on towns, such as
North Hempstead, which attempt to regulate topless entertainment.
70.

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.

15, 24 (1973),

Supreme Court attempt at setting a standard for obscenity.

71.
72.
73.

for the most recent

354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 484-85.
522 F.2d at 1046, 1049.

74. It is clear that Salem II marks the demise of the Brandon Shores-Moreria
line of cases as effective precedent for municipal regulation of topless dancing. The
decision rejects any regulation of the activity based solely on the premise that it is mere
conduct. Furthermore, although the court did not expressly direct its attention to

sections 245.01 and 245.02 of the New York Penal Law, it nevertheless appears that

their usefulness in this area has been severely curtailed. The only area left to the pro-

visions seems to be topless waitresses. In this regard, see People v. Price, 33 N.Y.2d 831,
832, 307 N.E.2d 46, 47, 351 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974 (1973).
75.

68 Misc. 2d at 346, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
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In order to satisfy the compelling interest requirements of the first
test, it is necessary that the dancing pose an actual threat to the internal well-being of the community. However, the record in Salem 11
indicates that the Town of North Hempstead experienced no serious
disorders because of topless dancing. In fact, the entertainment was
effectively insulated from those who did not wish to partake of it.
Furthermore, as Judge Oakes found, topless dancing appears to be an
innocuous form of behavior. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situation
which would lead to the serious disruptions of the magnitude of
those described in Feiner, where the Supreme Court did find that the
compelling governmental interest test had been met. Thus, satisfying
the first test will be an uphill battle for the concerned municipality.
Proof of obscenity is no less difficult. Although the Supreme
Court in Miller v. California76 sought to delineate a specific standard,
obscenity still remains an illusive and ill-defined concept.7 7 The municipality's problem is further compounded because topless dancing does
not appear on its face to come within the Miller test of "patent offensiveness." 78 Furthermore, while Miller stated that obscenity would be
determined by prevailing community standards, the New York Court
of Appeals has held that the measure for the standard is the state, not
the local community. 79 Therefore, although the citizens of North
Hempstead might think that topless dancing is obscene, such a belief
might not comport with statewide standards. Even if the court of
appeals had not spoken, the Supreme Court of the United States has
made it clear that local juries do not have unlimited discretion in
determining what is obscene.8 0 A recent New York Supreme Court
decision reflects the practical difficulties which the obscenity standard
76. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
77. The tortuous history of obscenity law bears this out. See, e.g., Comment,
Miller v. California: A Cold Shower for the First Amendment, 48 ST. JOHNs L. REv.
568, 568-84 (1974). See also Fahringer & Brown, The Rise and Fall of Roth-A
Critique of the Recent Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions, 62 Ky. L.J. 731 (1973-74).
It is doubtful that Miller will rectify the situation. For such a pessimistic view, see
Comment, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 HARv.L. REv. 1838, 1838-61 (1975).
78. 413 U.S. at 24. See also the Court's examples of what might constitute obscenity. Id. at 25. Topless dancing per se does not seem to fit here either. In 1974, the
New York penal provision relating to obscenity was amended to bring the state law
into conformity with Miller. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 235.00(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
79. People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d 314, 322-23, 307 N.E.2d 805, 810, 352 N.Y.S.2d
601, 608-09 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 944 (1974).
80. In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the Court stated that "it would
be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that juries have unbridled discretion in
determining what is 'patently offensive.'" Id. at 160.
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presents to local municipalities. In Lucifer's Gate v. Town of Van
Buren,8 1 an "anti-topless" ordinance similar to North Hempstead's revised ordinance was struck down, partly because no demonstration of
obscenity had been made.
One final regulatory alternative stems from the power of the
municipality to regulate topless dancing in conjunction with a liquor
control program. As mentioned earlier, North Hempstead relied
heavily on LaRue, and the revised ordinance reflected this reliance
by addressing itself to the power of the municipality to augment the
state's liquor control program.8 2 In Salem 11 the court did not decide
whether the Town in fact had the authority to assume a degree of
responsibility for the flow of alcoholic beverages within the community.
Judge Oakes merely stated that the twenty-first amendment did not
justify North Hempstead's regulation of topless performances because
the revised ordinance was not confined solely to places which dispensed
liquor.8 3 He further concluded that "there [was] not involved the kind
of conduct properly subject to regulation as a phase of liquor licensing."8 4 Thus, the possibility exists-albeit only a faint one-that
a municipality may be able to prohibit topless dancing if it confines
such a measure only to places which dispense drink. However, there is
no indication that the New York State Liquor Authority has delegated any authority to local governments to regulate the flow of alcohol.8 5 Furthermore, the SLA recently issued an amendment which
specifically permits topless dancing in establishments it has licensed,
so long as the activity conforms to certain standards.,
B. Salem 11 and Other Courts
Salem 11 is not compatible with approaches taken in other jurisdictions. Invariably, those recent cases which have sustained "anti81.
82.
83.

83 Misc. 2d 790, 373 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
See NORTi HEmPSTEAD, N.Y., CODE ch. 11, § 1.0 (1970).
522 F.2d at 1050.

84. Id. at 1047.
85. Whether any such delegation of power is possible under New York Law is
unclear. See, e.g., N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONTROL LAWV §§ 2, 17 (McKinney 1970). Compare

Town of Fenton v. Tedino, 78 Misc. 2d 319, 356 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1974);

People v. Kriessel, 63 Misc. 2d 72, 311 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Onondaga County Ct. 1970); and
Grundman v. Town of Brighton, 5 Misc. 2d 1006, 166 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct. 1956);

with Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 415-17, 509 P.2d 497, 504-05, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 681, 688-89 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974).
86. Divisional Order #694, (S), Dec. 10, 1975, Nudity in Licensed Premises,

Rule 36 (9 NYCRR 53), State of New York Liquor Authority (copy maintained in
files of Buffalo Law Review). See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 53.1 (s) (50.1 EX 12/31/75).
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topless" measures rally around a 1973 ruling by the California Supreme
Court. In Crownover v. Musick,8 7 California's highest court affirmed a

series of local ordinances, similar to North Hempstead's laws, which
prohibit topless dancing (as well as bottomless dancing and topless
88
waitresses) in public places.
The California court's reasoning is worth examining in some detail
because it appears to be in direct opposition to that employed in
Salem II. In addressing the issue of nude dancing in bars, the court
said that it was "common knowledge that such conduct is nothing more
than a sales gimmick."8 9 The court strongly implied that it was faced
with a form of conduct almost totally devoid of a speech element, and
that consequently the first amendment was not applicable. The tribunal went on to note, however, that even assuming the existence of
a communicative element sufficient to invoke the amendment in conduct falling within the prohibitions of the instant ordinances, the
regulations were nonetheless justifiable on the basis of O'Brien. The
court held that the regulations were "aimed at [separately identifiable]
conduct, [and] not speech." 90 Therefore, "an important or substantial
governmental interest" was sufficient to support regulation of the nonspeech conduct in that case. 91 By making full use of the O'Brienspeechconduct dichotomy, the California Supreme Court and its followers
are obviously at odds with the Second Circuit.9 2 It should be noted,
87.

9 Cal. 3d 405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973),

cert. denied, 415

U.S. 931 (1974).
88. The prohibitions did not apply to a "theater, concert hall, or similar establishment which is primarily devoted to theatrical performances." 9 Cal. 3d at 410, 509

P.2d at 513, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
89. Id. at 426, 509 P.2d at 511, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
90. Id. at 427, 509 P.2d at 512, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
91. Id. at 427, 509 P.2d at 511-12, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 695-96, quoting United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
92. One possible explanation for the willingness of the Crownover court to assign
topless dancing lesser first amendment protection than did the Second Circuit may be
that the California Supreme Court does not believe such dancing represents a traditional
mode of first amendment expression. In a recent article, Professor John Hart Ely noted
that the O'Brien Court may have assigned draft card burning slight first amendment
protection because it was unconsciously attempting to deal with a form of expression it
found to be unorthodox. Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1488 (1975).
Since Crownover relied heavily on O'Brien, it is arguable that the California court was
also troubled by the medium of expression before it. The general tone of the opinion
reveals this uneasiness.
The Salem II court, however, was not bothered by the fact that the dancing is performed in the semi-nude or takes place in a bar. Judge Oakes' linking of topless dancing
in the Salem Inn with its "counterpart" in the legitimate theater evidences a belief that
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however, that the Second Circuit did not reject O'Brien outright as a
viable tool for first amendment analysis. Judge Oakes' ruling simply
stands for the proposition that O'Brien is not applicable to the form
of expression embodied in topless dancing.
C. The Supreme Court and Topless Dancing in Light of Salem II
The law on topless dancing is clearly unsettled and will ultimately
have to be determined by the Supreme Court. 3 There is some indication that if presented with the fact situation of Salem II, the Court
would reach a conclusion similar to that reached by the Second Circuit.
Although it denied certiorari in Crownover94 and has never directly
addressed the question of whether dancing per se is a form of communication protected from state intrusions, 5 the Court has stated
several times that entertainment, as much as "expression," is protected
by the first amendment.0 6 Furthermore, it has extended constitutional
protection to controversial and sexually explicit theatrical productionsY
In addition, the Court has recently voided a Florida municipal ordinance which prohibited, among other things, the depiction of the uncovered female breast in a drive-in movie.98 Another positive sign was
provided in Doran where, in referring to LaRue, Justice Rehnquist
noted that "bar room" type nude dancing might under some circumstances be entitled to first amendment protection. 0
On the other hand, while the Court might be willing to afford
topless dancing some first amendment protection, it is arguable that
it may not be willing to assign the activity as much protection as did
the Second Circuit. The absolutist position would seem to conflict with
the medium itself is dance and that, since dance has been traditionally accorded broad
first amendment protection, the form it takes (short of obscenity or conflict with legitimate governmental interests) is not the controlling factor.
93. There is no indication that the Town of North Hempstead seeks to pursue
its case to the Supreme Court at this time.
94. 415 U.S. 931 (1974).
95. Live performances and dance, however, have been afforded broad prima fade
first amendment protection. See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
See also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 123 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). See also Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of State Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
97. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 95 S. Ct, 1239 (1975)
(denial of application to perform the rock musical "Hair" deemed an unconstitutional
prior restraint).
98. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
99. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975).
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the Court's holding in LaRue.10 0 In addition, despite the problems inherent in the O'Brien speech-conduct dichotomy, 1' 1 the Court has not
expressed a willingness to abandon it as a first amendment analytical
device, 10 2 although its application seems to have been restricted to
narrowly defined situations. 10 3 Moreover, the Court has noted that "as
the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the commission
of public acts," the scope of state regulation becomes increasingly
04
broad.
CONCLUSION

By declaring North Hempstead's "anti-topless" ordinance unconstitutional, the Second Circuit in Salem II has decided that topless
dancing contains a speech element sufficient to bring it within the
purview of the first amendment. This result was accomplished by perceiving a conceptual similarity between partially nude dancing in a
bar and nude dancing performed in the "legitimate" theatre. For the
Court, a nude ballet offered at Lincoln Center differs from topless
dancing offered at the Salem Inn only in scope and extravagance, not
in concept. Both involve expression protected by the first amendment.
Although the Salem II court did not prohibit all governmental
regulation of topless dancing, the fundamental right of expression
inherent in this form of entertainment places a heavy burden of justification on municipalities which seek to ban it. Local governments will
100. One of the critical factors in LaRue was the Court's determination that the
sexual entertainment proscribed by the regulations contained only a minor speech element. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. By employing the O'Brien speech-conduct
analysis, the Court was in a position to sustain the measures, particularly since the
entertainment was prohibited only in licensed establishments and the state was acting
pursuant to its power to control the flow of alcohol within its borders. In short, the
Court found that the regulations amounted to only an incidental infringment of first
amendment freedoms.
If, however, the Court were to adopt the Second Circuit's finding that topless
dancing is a single expressive entity entitled to full first amendment protection, it would
be forced to say-if it still wished to regulate the activity pursuant to the twenty-first
amendment-that the amendment is sufficient authorization for the regulation of first
amendment freedoms. While it is evident that LaRue stands for the proposition that
drink and blatantly sexual entertainment do not mix, it is doubtful that the Court
would be willing to extend the notion too far in the first amendment area.
101. For the problems which O'Brien presents, see Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68
COLUm. L. REv. 1091, 1098-1115 (1968). In the context of topless dancing, the dissent
in Grownover strikes some telling blows to the O'Brien speech-conduct analysis. 9 Cal.
3d at 436-44, 509 P.2d at 517-24, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 703-08 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
102. See, e.g., Californiav. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
103. See, e.g., Spence v. California, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974) (per curiam).
104. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972).
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be hard pressed to demonstrate that topless dancing is obscene or in
conflict with compelling interests of the state. Moreover, at this time
it does not appear likely that municipalities will be able to regulate
topless dancing through augmentation of state liquor control programs.
Towns like North Hempstead will have no alternative but to be
circumspect in their attempts to regulate topless dancing in bars and
like establishments. Those who are viscerally opposed to such entertainment on the grounds that it represents an attack on the moral structure of the community will no doubt disagree with Judge Oakes' finding that partially nude performances are merely a "harmless form of
diversion," best left to individual choice. Nevertheless, the court has
made it clear that any regulation of topless dancing based on "distaste"
is a form of censorship and hence unacceptable. Thus, unless the
Supreme Court of the United States should decide to assign topless
dancing lesser protection than did the Second Circuit, municipalities
within the court's jurisdiction will be required to heed the command
of Salem 11.10 5
ANDREW C. SPACONE

105. Municipalities might wish to think about zoning as a possible solution to
their problems in this area. Although the Salem II court did not address the issue, the
district court implied that it might be a possible alternative to prohibition. Salem Inn,
Inc. v. Frank, 381 F. Supp. 859, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
There are at least two possible approaches to the problem. First, municipalities might
wish to effect so-called "cluster" zoning, that is, confine blatantly sexual entertainment to
a specific area within the municipality. Boston, Massachusetts, has adopted such a plan
with mixed results. See, Gumpert, X-Rated Businesses in Boston Area Are Given Home

on the Raunch, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 1. The second alternative is "dispersal" zoning. In 1972, the City of Detroit amended an earlier "Anti-Skld Row
Ordinance" with two measures which provided, inter alia, that adult movie theatres
may not be located within 1,000 feet of any other "regulated uses"-adult book stores,
cabarets, bars-and within 500 feet of residental areas. DETROIT, MICI., COD, Ordn.
891-G, c. 68; Ordn. 742-G, § 66.0103 (1972).
Although the Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of "cluster" zoning, it recently sustained the Detroit ordinances in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4999 (June 24, 1976). Apparently crucial
to the Court's reasoning is the premise that because of content, certain forms of expression merit less protection than others under the first amendment. Id. at 5004-05.
The Supreme Court did not address the issue of topless dancing in Young v.
American Mini Theatres. Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that partially nude dancing in a
bar would be susceptible to zoning restrictions, particularly if it is regarded as a lesser
form of expression. Just such a position has been taken by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In a decision which predated Young v. American Mini Theatres, the federal

appellate court found the same Detroit ordinances to be facially constitutional vis-ai-vis
topless dancing. Felix v. Young, 536 F.2d 1129, 1138 (6th Cir. 1976). It is interesting
to note that the court relied heavily on Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). See notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text.

